

**01608**

**1993/08/16**

CONFIDENTIAL

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DOC\_NUMBER: 93BEIJIN29233

CHANNEL: n/a

E16

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ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	CIP-10	COME-00	CTME-00
	CFE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-03	ADS-00	NEA-01	NRRC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OES-09	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01
	P-01	SDEL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-16
	TRSE-00	TST-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	CORE-00	SSD-01
	/079W						

EXCISE

P  
B5  
B1 CBA

-----E31E0A 161203Z /38

O 161200Z AUG 93  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7577  
INFO CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DHAHHRAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELEASE  DECLASSIFY  Date: 4/10/97  
EXCISE  DENY  IN PART  
DECLASSIFY EO Citations B1 B6

FOIA Exemptions  TS authority to  
PA Exemptions  CLASSIFY as ( )S or ( )C Sec. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
DOWNGRADE TS to ( )S or ( )C

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ABU DHABI PASS DUBAI, CENTCOM ALSO POLAD, JCS FOR DIA

DEPT S/S-0 ALERT PM DAS EINHORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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PAGE 02 BEIJIN 29233 01 OF 02 161202Z  
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, IR, CH  
SUBJECT: CHINESE REACT TO U.S. TALKING POINTS AND PASS  
CHINESE PAPER FOR USE IN JOINT DEMARCHE TO THE UAEG ON  
THE "YIN HE" CASE -- AUGUST 16

REFTELS: A. STATE 249137 AND PREVIOUS; B. BEIJING  
29021 AND PREVIOUS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
- /
2. ACTION REQUEST: SEE PARA 8.
- /
3. SUMMARY: ON AUGUST 16, CHINESE MFA INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR SHA ZUKANG  
COMMENTED ON REF A U.S. TALKING POINTS AND PASSED US  
CHINESE TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN A JOINT DEMARCHE TO

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THE UAEG. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY REQUESTING ITS CHIEF OF MISSION IN ABU DHABI TO START MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR A JOINT DEMARCHE. END SUMMARY.

4. ON AUGUST 16, SHA CALLED POLMINCOUNS TO THE MFA AND COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON REF A U.S. TALKING POINTS BEFORE HANDING US A COPY OF THE CHINESE DRAFT FOR USE IN A JOINT DEMARCHE. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT CHINA'S CHIEF OF MISSION IN ABU DHABI WOULD EXPECT THE U.S. CHIEF OF MISSION TO GO FIRST. HE STRESSED THAT, IN COMMENTING ON THE U.S. TALKING POINTS, CHINA DID NOT WANT TO TELL THE U.S. WHAT TO SAY AND HOW TO DRAFT, AND WOULD NOT QUibble WITH THE POINTS OUR CHIEF OF MISSION WOULD MAKE AS PRESENTED REF A. HIS THIRD AND FOURTH COMMENTS (BELOW) SEEM PARTICULARLY WORTHY OF CONFIDENTIAL

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ATTENTION. FOLLOWING ARE SHA'S SPECIFIC COMMENTS:

-- RE POINT ONE, RE U.S.-CHINA JOINT CONCERN "OVER THE POSSIBILITY" THAT THE "YIN HE" "MAY" BE CARRYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRECURSORS, CHINA HAD MANY TIMES STATED THAT, AFTER THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, NO SUCH CHEMICALS ARE ON BOARD. [REDACTED]

B1(b)

-- RE POINT FOUR, CHINA WOULD NOT OBJECT, BUT FOUND THE WORDS "THE COOPERATIVE WAY" DIFFICULT TO FATHOM, SINCE THE U.S. REFUSED TO TRUST CHINA'S ASSURANCES. [REDACTED]

B1(b)

-- RE POINT SIX, CHINA DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. FELT IT NECESSARY TO SINGLE OUT IRAN, WHEN OUR JOINT CONCERN IS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON A UNIVERSAL BASIS. [REDACTED]

B1(B)  
B5

-- RE POINT FIVE, SHA SAID THAT PERHAPS THE ENGLISH WOULD BE CLEAER TO FOREIGN EARS WERE THE WORDS "TECHNICAL ADVISORS" TO BE INSERTED THUS: "IN THIS LIGHT, WE HOPE YOU WILL AGREE TO ALLOW U.S. TECHNICAL PERSONNEL AS TECHNICAL ADVISORS TO ACCOMPANY THE UAE SIDE."

B1(d)  
B1(b)

5. SHA THEN PASSED A CHINESE PAPER WHICH HE SAID THE CONFIDENTIAL

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
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CHINESE CHIEF OF MISSION WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO USE IN  
MAKING A JOINT DEMARCHE:



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ACTION EAP-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	CIP-10	COME-00	CTME-00
	CFE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09
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	TRSE-00	TST-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	CORE-00	SSD-01
	/079W						

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O 161200Z AUG 93  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7578  
INFO CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DHARAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY  
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AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 029233

ABU DHABI PASS DUBAI, CENTCOM ALSO POLAD, JCS FOR DIA

DEPT S/S-0 ALERT PM DAS EINHORN

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b1b

(END TEXT)

6. SHA SAID THE CHINESE CHIEF OF MISSION IN ABU DHABI WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE UAEG IMMEDIATELY TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR A JOINT DEMARCHE.

7. SHA INDICATED THAT CHINA IS CONSIDERING SENDING A TECHNICAL TEAM FROM BEIJING TO DUBAI AND THAT HE MAY BE ACCOMPANYING THIS TEAM ALONG, PERHAPS, WITH OTHER OFFICIALS.

B5

8. ACTION REQUEST:

B5

9. EARLIER, ON AUGUST 15, IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT OF REF A, POLMINCOUNS PASSED REF A TALKING POINTS TO THE CHINESE MFA, AND SPOKE SUBSEQUENTLY TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR SHA ZUKANG TO CONFIDENTIAL

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REITERATE THE POINTS CONTAINED AT REF A PARAS 3 AND 4, POINTS WHICH WE HAD MADE IN TWO PREVIOUS ENCOUNTERS WITH SHA (REF B AND PREVIOUS). IN RESPONSE, SHA REITERATED THAT CHINA UNDERSTOOD WHY THE U.S. SOUGHT TO INSPECT THE TWENTY-FOUR CONTAINERS BOUND DIRECTLY FROM CHINA TO IRAN, AND WHY THE U.S. NEEDED TO SEE THE SHIP'S MANIFEST.

b1(b)

REF ID: A61203Z

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CHANNEL: n/a

ORIGINATOR  
[REDACTED]

b1 (g)

[REDACTED]  
ROY

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a  
\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL